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TRIAL PRACTICE IN ACCIDENT LITIGATION
ROBERT H. JAcKSON*

Of the many criticisms which the lay world aims at the legal
profession, the most justifiable is that great uncertainty exists both
in the law which we apply and in the results which attend our procedure. None may deny that charge; we can differ only as to how
much of the uncertainty is inherent and unavoidable and how much
we contribute by our philosophy and practice.
All men take increased interest in the law of negligence since
society gained motorized momentum, ceased rubbing elbows, and
began to crash fenders. Litigations over wills, contracts, bailments,
or domestic relations are for the relatively few. They result from
relations voluntarily, if not always deliberately, assumed and are
largely against adversaries with whom one elected to deal. Their
solution in the courts, if not highly satisfactory, is not scandalous.
Likewise many of the tort actions, such as slander, malicious prosecution, criminal conversation, and the like are so relatively few in
number and affect so few persons that they can not become a source
of widespread complaint. But under modem conditions we can
neither escape nor prepare for accidents. They involve us with all
types of men, and drive us to court to seek reparation or to assert
imamunity from liability. The predominant contact between our
judicial system and society is through the negligence cases which
congest our calendars, produce ambulance chasers, prosper insurance
companies, make promises to plaintiff's ears often to be broken to
the hope, bring vexation or disaster to defendants, and cause most
of the criticism of the courts, the law, and the bar.
Abuses in the personal injury practice have reached such magnitude
that highly influential and responsible sources within the profession
propose to remove the whole matter from the courts, to make automobile liability insurance compulsory, and to condition all insurance
to provide for settlements by award of an administrative tribunal
such as the workmen's compensation boards. This would largely
dispense with the lawyer, and while it would seriously impair the
sources of income of great numbers of attorneys, it seems likely to
come about in some form if present abuses and uncertainties can
not otherwise be overcome. The wide range of possible legal results
from each simple accident exerts a most corrupting influence upon
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the legal profession. Its temptation must be met by greater resistance from the lawyers, or society will act to remove the temptation. We being forced to such a choice, is it too idealistic to urge
starvation rather than prostitution?
Assurance has become a passion of the business world. Certain
or predictable burdens are translated into terms of overhead or living
costs. Unforeseen burdens spell disaster. Hence assurance against
hazard has become one of the thriving enterprises of the modem
economic order, and it is not surprising that the business world,
ever ready to pay a premium for certainty, looks with disapproval
upon the profession in whose hands and by whose processes all
events are doubtful. What lawyer, after careful study of available
information, can today honestly advise a client that he is or is not
to be held liable, or can say what the extent of that liability will be?
Liability strikes like lightning, unwarned, unpredictable, and its
damage immeasurable. Yet since the Ten Commandments or the
Twelve Tables, it has been an accepted axiom that the law one must
obey shall be ascertainable. How may one learn what conduct will
be "reasonably prudent" when weighed in a negligence trial? Uncertainty as to law and result is not confined to the personal injury
case, but is present in a serious, if not equal, degree in a claimed
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, or in a public utility rate
case.
Much irregularity in legal process is inherent. Where it is necessary to resolve disputed facts there is great range in keenness of observation, clarity of expression, and even veracity of witnesses, as well as
great scope for error in conflicting inferences to be drawn from the
testimony. But there is a persistent, insidious, and plausible tendency toward uncertainty in everything that legal reasoning touches.
It could, at a price of course, be avoided. The tendency is easier to
illustrate than to describe.
The legislature after careful consideration of the interests of
society declares, for example, that: "Every driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the
right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his
right, except where otherwise directed by a traffic officer or by a
lawful traffic regulation device or signal".' This rule is as arbitrary
as it is clear and simple. On its face it imposes upon the driver
approaching from the left the obligation of avoiding a collision.
He must avoid interference at his peril. Liability for collision would
be settled by one inquiry, who came from the left? The rule of law
IN. Y. CoNs. LAws, c. 70 (GEN. HIGHWAY TRAPFIC LAW) § 12 (4).
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to be applied is intelligible. Whatever its faults, want of simplicity
is not one of them.
Yet this simple rule ran the gauntlet of the courts and emerged a
different thing. Said the Court of Appeals, "[T]he application of this
statute must depend upon all the surrounding circumstances, the
point, the speed and the reldistance of the cars from the intersecting
2
ative duties placed upon each".
If two cars collided it would seem conclusive that no matter what
the distance it was not enough, no matter what the speed it was too
great, no matter what the relative duties the absolute duty upon
the left car to yield the right of way until safe passage could be made
was violated. But the court even says, "[Tihe questions which arise
over collisions at intersections of highways are always more or less
perplexing.. Much of the uncertainty is due, no doubt, to subdivision 4, Section 12 of the General Highway Traffic Law. "3
The criticism of the court is not that they did not think as good
lawyers; as legal philosophy their decision was probably sound.
The court chose between two lines of public policy. It could not
think in the simple terms of the statutory command; it reverted
to the complex legal reasoning involving.a combination of principles
and depending upon multiplied conditions which the statute tried to
supersede.
The literal rule of the statute is arbitrary but clear. It might
impose an unreasonable liability, but, if so, it is one that can be
ascertained without a lawsuit. Any man may know whether he is
entering or did enter an intersection from the left or the right and
may govern his conduct both in driving and in litigating accordingly.
The rule of the court is reasonable and flexible and vague. Instead
of a simple inquiry as to whence the defendant approached, we
have the compound problem of relative speeds, distances, signals,
lookouts, elapsed time, upon all of which witnesses are so glib and
inaccurate, even when honest. The court's rule introduces such
complexities and contradictions and finesse of reasoning as are
certain to result in litigation."
It is not clear to me whether this inclination of judge and lawyer is
disinterested philosophy or a "defense mechanism". Why such
abhorrence of an arbitrary rule of liability fixed by the legislature in
advance, and such devotion to an arbitrary determination of liability by a jury after the fact? Are we biased by an unconscious
regard for the welfare of our craft or moved by a pure philosophy of
2

Schuman v. HaHl, 246 N. Y. 51, 54, 158 N. E. 16, 17
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reasonableness? If the only controversy in a lawsuit were as to
which car entered upon the right, there would be little field for the
exercise of the talents of the lawyer; perhaps there would even be
no lawsuit. It is in the field of uncertainty that the lawyer wins
fame as a cross-examiner, a persuasive reasoner, a skillful tactician,
an artist at enlarging verdicts in doubtful cases. Hence while laymen
crave certainty we abhor a proceeding where two and two must
always make four-we want a chance by forensic skill to build two
and two up to six or hold them down to three, and now and then to
get two and two returned by a jury as a cipher. Hence we approach
the interpretation of a statute firmly convinced that it would be
arbitrary to have liability follow a single simple fact but quite reasonable to have it follow a complicated ex post facto blending by a jury
of many facts in unknown proportions. The fact that our philosophy and our interests coincide probably does not impair our faith
in the philosophy.
Society may not have a rule at once arbitrary and flexible, at once
certain and yet yielding to circumstance. It must choose between
clarity and sweet reasonableness. Did it not through the legislature
make its choice? It prefers certainty. It chafes under our effort
at weighing collateral acts; it seeks the rule of res ipsa loquitur. It
regards our philosophy as confounding and unjust-and takes out
an insurance policy against the uncertainty of the courts as it would
against the caprice of weather or fire or other element.
A favorite "alibi" of our profession, when charged with maladministration of justice, and a favorite point of attack on our legal system,
in which many lawyers are joining, is the jury system. Newspapers
carry dramatic stories of apparent miscarriages of justice; the jury
room is pictured as a sanctuary in which, once he reaches it, the
criminal is safe. Utility enterprises, insurance companies, and men
of property claim they are penalized by its prejudice; higher courts
reverse its errors; lawyers make play upon its inconsistencies.
Well-considered opinion will distinguish, however, the faults of
the jury itself from the faults of our method of conducting causes
before it. Since our whole society joins in creating the jury as our
tribunal, we lawyers are not responsible for its existence. Those
methods, however, which tend to confuse it, to obscure its view of
the facts, to inflame its passions or play upon its prejudices, we as a
profession are responsible for. It is difficult to escape the conviction that the bar is to blame for a large share of the criticism
aimed at the jury. Why blame an untrained jury for yielding to
passion or prejudice and excuse an educated lawyer for fanning it?
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Since the jury of laymen, with modifications in procedure and
methods, perhaps, seems destined to survive for many generations as
the dominant tribunal for determining questions of fact, it behooves
the bar to work out a trial technique that will accord with its peculiar characteristics.
This conviction of jury permanence is less due to merits of the
jury than to defects of any substitute system. Judges are reversed
for error as often as juries, and almost every instance of prejudice,
ignorance, or corruption of juries can be paralleled by an example
from the judiciary. The trial of ordinary causes before good trial
judges is slower, more costly, and usually less satisfactory than jury
trial. Juries at least commit their errors within a few hours and
leave one to his remedy. In equity, however, consideration of the
case, even on the facts, is usually postponed until all of the witnesses
and most of the testimony are forgotten; then the transcribed record
is briefed and requests submitted and decision dragged until the client
suspects the zeal of counsel and the integrity of the judge. Equity is
a lawyer's court; it has never had the confidence of the laymen
that has been the lot of the law court.
Moreover, I am convinced that the jury, for reasons of statecraft,
is destined to survive. This too is based upon the absence of a
better method of deciding controverted questions of fact. It is
doubtful if any other system could survive from generation to generation the shock of deciding questions of fact. One street railroad
with a heavy litigation calendar was able for a considerable period to>
win from juries no cause verdicts in nearly one-third of its trials,
and about half of the remaining verdicts were in amounts disappointing to the plaintiffs. Of course the large and spectacular verdicts
reached the newspapers; those disappointing to plaintiffs did not.
No judge could have maintained himself upon that bench who decided one-third of the cases before him in favor of an unpopular
public utility and disappointed the plaintiff as to amount in another
third of the cases. He would have been subjected to public attacks
which, if they would not have driven him from the bench, would have
made his return to the bench an impossibility. Judicial tribunals
which have attempted to settle questions of fact, such as utility commissions, are notoriously short-lived and succumb to an accumulation
of grievances, but a judicial system must live from generation to.
generation.
The jury system possesses peculiar characteristics which gives the
public confidence that its errors are but a manifestation of weakness
inherent in the average man and are not due to that peculiar type of
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average man beaten by a jury damns it for its dullness and curses
its prejudice or stubbornness or ignorance, and goes back to his work
resigned to the act of a jury as to an act of God. But if beaten by a
judge, he suspects foul play or overinfluence of an adversary, doubts
the integrity of the judiciary in general, and waits for an election.
A jury trial leaves the citizen feeling that he has had his day in court,
even if it is a sad one; and the nature of the jury is such that it cannot be campaigned against.
The jury is a paradox. It is permanent but it is always changing,
ready to decide all cases and yet never deciding but one. It is called
into being on the morning of the trial, does unwillingly, and perhaps
poorly, its duty, and after the verdict melts away into the elements
from which it came. It may be cursed but it is gone. It had no
ambition to live again and probably could not again be assembled.
It may have all other vices but it has not the vice of ambition. It
cannot be identified in advance and is not subject to the social and
other influences that are sometimes alleged to weigh with judges.
It returns its verdict without fear that it will be turned out of office.
These peculiarities go a long way to offset the inability of jurors to
comprehend the fourth dimensional reasoning of which our courts
are so fond, and which, however admirable in the field of pure philosophy, is not very helpful in solving the problems of our rough life.
In all of the literature attacking the jury system, I have seen no
suggestion of a substitute tribunal that could gain and keep public
confidence as the jury system has done. While a particular lawyer
engaged in a particular litigation may not care how his tribunal
stands in the estimation of the public so long as it has legal power
to give him a decision, from the point of view of society, it is tremendously important that the deciders of fact have the confidence of all
classes of people; that the judgment seat be shared to some degree
by humble citizens; that men in all walks of life may know that
they may meet their peers in judgment. If business men complain
that they seldom meet their peers upon the jury, it is largely because
they are suffering from a superiority complex which makes them
disdain jury duty; the fault is the psychology of the business clan
and is not inherent in the jury system. Given a jury drawn from all
classes of people and without exemption of the ever-complaining
business man, presided over by a judge of character, courage, and a
fair measure of legal intelligence, attended by lawyers intent upon
trying their cases upon the merits, the jury system provides a tribunal
as satisfactory as any that has ever been devised.
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Assuming, then, continuance of the jury system, the duty devolves upon the bar to develop a trial technique which will reconcile
the weaknesses of the ancient system with the modem demands
upon it. To that end, the legal philosophy we expect jurors to apply
must be simple and direct, the issues clear cut and the controversy
limited to as few elements as possible, the machinery of presentation
free of false motions and confusions.
This does not mean that all of the adaptation must be on the part
of the bar. It is not certain but modifications of the jury system
could adapt it somewhat to the growing complexity of its problems.
Requirement of a unanimous verdict may in time be superseded by a
two-thirds or even a majority rule. The unanimous verdict may
not only load, but overload, the dice in favor of a defendant. If a
majority vote is deemed sufficient to impose a rule of conduct or
liability upon a whole state perhaps a majority is enough to apply it
to an individual. Probably too, the general verdict enables the jury to
reach results satisfactory to it without due consideration of the
several elements that go to make up liability. More careful and impersonal consideration would result from requiring it to answer
specific questions which the court would assemble and embody in a
judgment according to the legal effect of the answers.
Among major adjustments of the law to the jury may be suggested
a restriction of the permissible latitude in personal injury cases.
No lawyer can give a client more than a sort of well-informed guess
at the worth of a negligence case. Juries return and courts sustain
verdicts from almost nothing to almost anything for identical injuries. No small part of the stubborn resistance to liability, the
feverish speculation in personal injury litigations, and the sordid
atmosphere that attends their disposition is due to the fact that an
injury that will net one plaintiff five hundred dollars for "pain and
suffering", will net another five thousand through the art of counsel,
tact of witnesses, sex of the plaintiff, or financial condition of the
defendant.
The better reason would suggest that damages be fixed by legislation by schedules of indemnity, either in a fixed proportion of lost
earning power or in a fixed schedule of disability plus expense of
treatment. If liability were found, the schedule should be applied
as it is applied in workmen's compensation. If we remove from
negligence litigation the speculative feature as to the amount of
recovery, half of the cases now litigated would be settled. The
illusive hope of making a fortune out of a misfortune leads plaintiffs
to reject reasonable offers of settlement. The hope of a compromise
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verdict leads defendants to chance trial rather than to make just and
voluntary compensation. To the insurance company or utility with
whom litigation is a matter of averages, this wide range may not be
so serious, for if it loses one it ought to win, it compensates by winning
one that it ought to lose. But to a plaintiff who is but one day in
court and who has no series of hazards to average and equalize,
the result is, as Chief Judge Cardozo said, "catastrophic". Society
could well deny plaintiffs the right to struggle for extravagant compensation and extend to them the greater certainty of fair compensation.
Afar reaching step in the better ordering of our procedure would be
to educate a specialized bar for the trial of cases. 4 The separation of
function between counselor and advocate is not an arbitrary division
but a natural one. Trial work would be greatly simplified if it were
pursued by a relatively few lawyers as a career, instead of being
incidental and often secondary work to the whole mass of lawyers.
Such a bar would specialize in procedure and evidence and would
acquike the practical art of proof as well as learn the abstract science
of evidence.
Separation of solicitor from barrister and special training and restriction of the latter to trial work would result in a smaller trial bar,
closer acquaintance, and more accurate knowledge. Conduct of
litigation would be a career and not a mere interruption of more
profitable office work. It could not fail to result in better qualified
judges, for the bench reflects the qualifications of the profession
from which it is selected. Employment would come to the trial bar
largely from counselors in touch with the sources of litigation. The
advocate who looks to such sources for retainers is likely to maintain
higher professional standards than one who appeals to the public,
for he knows that his standards will be better appreciated and more
accurately judged. Maneuvers to please bitter clients or attract
attention from reporters would be less frequent if the chief channel
of employment of the trial lawyer were through counselors who discountenanced such tactics.
Trial work would be more expeditious and results less unsatisfactory if required legal education included the art of trial as well
as the science of procedure. To conduct court work with dispatch
and effect, one must know much more than the law governing his
case. He must have skill as well as learning.
It is a weakness of our educational system that one may master
the theory of evidence and still be unable quickly and simply to
4The author has expanded upon this matter in an article, Advocacy as a Special-

ized Career (1929) 7 N. Y. L. REv. 77.
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prove the signature on a promissory note. Evidence is taught largely
in the negative. The young lawyer receives little help from textbooks and decisions as to how he should prove his case, but the suggestions as to how he should not are many. It is the lawyer's errors
rather than his good work that are immortalized in the decisions.
Courts of review write to point out the errors below, and the good
objections that were taken; but seldom does a judicial opinion
record the good work of a trial lawyer or point out the way that a
particular problem should be met. The study of most sciences
is a study of the successful work of one's seniors. Study of the law of
evidence is a research in blunders.
The course in evidence arms the yotmg lawyer with a head full
of objections with no restraint on the use of them. Objection being
the thing the lawyer is qualified in, the American trial is composed of
a vast number of objections that are never seriously pressed but
which take time and lend it an atmosphere of confusion and contest.
The number of objections in the average record on appeal impeaches the training and good faith of one or both lawyers, for while
there will always be some difference of opinion as to admissibility,
a well-trained profession should not in every trial make hundreds
of unfounded objections nor permit its practice to be subject to any
such number of good ones.
The art of trying lawsuits quickly and fairly requires a constructive
mind and an affirmative program of proof. The negative equipment of a young lawyer, his education in obstruction rather than
construction, perhaps explains why so many men can object to a
leading question who cannot frame one that is not leading.
Many lawyers fully trained in the theory of evidence and the
rules by which testimony is excluded cannot in a workmanlike
manner qualify an expert or ask a hypothetical question, or prove a
disputed signature or document, or establish an account stated.
Yet after trying with obvious blundering and embarrassment to put
in an affirmative case, the young counselor rises to the far more
treacherous work of cross-examination, care free and self-confident.
Here he feels at home. It is destructive work and fits his training, or
it is more lawless and fits his lack of it.
Another important step would be taken if litigations were conducted not only in the names of the real parties in interest, but also
in the names of all parties in interest whether contingent or absolute.
Too often the names of the litigants are but the dummies behind
which a lawyer who has become part owner of a claim and an insurance company which is resisting it fight their battles. Seeking
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for an honest result we start the case by an only half successful
deception of the jury as to whose controversy they are deciding.
The general resort to liability insurance protection from the hazards
of the law has crowded the court with professional litigants to whom a
lawsuit is not an event but a routine. The defendant's lawyer is but
a hired man, while the claimant's lawyer is all too frequently a partner
in the claim. It is not consistent with our theory of the position
of the advocate and his relation to the court that a lawyer should
either be a partner litigant or a hired man for a corporate professional
litigant. His position as an officer of the court necessarily assumes
that his relation to his client shall be such that he shall be in charge
of the litigation he is conducting and not a mere dependency of a claim
department and that he shall value his standing as a lawyer more
than the patronage of any client. It is difficult to say whether
the partnership status of claimant's lawyers or the hired man status
of many defendants' lawyers is more injurious to the legal profession;
but neither represents the true dignity and independence that should
pertain to an officer of the court.
Some other steps could be taken which would simplify jury trials.
The exception should of course be abolished. It has been so universally abused that it no longer has any meaning whatever when
taken, but often has disastrous consequences when omitted. It
would seem that the court by rule and without legislation could provide that each litigant should be deemed to have an exception to
every adverse ruling. Then the barking of an exception would cease.
That the meaningless exception still has disastrous significance in
this twentieth century, shows that the legal profession adheres
to its mysterious incantations with the devotion of an oriental priesthood.
We should surely arrive at some limitation of the number of
experts to be called on a side on any given point. If each side were
limited to one expert who should state his conclusion and the reasoning by which he supported them and leave his testimony to be
weighed by his reasoning rather than by the number who can be
found to join in his conclusion, it would save time and expense and be
more conducive to just results.
It would seem, too, that the profession might with reasonable
regard to the interests of its clients adopt more modem methods of
proof in many matters. For instance, why is it that a lawyer who
would invest his money unhesitatingly upon the stock quotations
contained in a newspaper would object strenuously to the receipt
of that same paper in evidence in a small lawsuit to establish the
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value at a given time of stocks in litigation? The same evidence that
is sufficient to guide his investments is not sufficient in his litigations.
Many examples might be given of similar inconsistencies, where the
court seeks proof from sources less reliable and disinterested than
those which guide the business world.
Lawyers may attain great eminence in the field of business, may
head industrial corporations and devise the plans and corporate
structures by which business should be conducted, but the lawyer's
one exclusive and distinctive field is litigation. He shares it with no
other. His right to pursue his vocation follows from admission
to the courts. Yet it is this primary function of the bar which is
most neglected and in which its conduct is most criticized. It would
seem that in maintaining its primary and most distinguishing field of
effort it should devote itself to developing a trial technique which
would meet the criticisms so often repeated and so justly deserved.
If the bar shall fail in court, where then shall it succeed?

